Книга: The Red Web: The Struggle Between Russia

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· #1

Pew Research Center, “Internet Seen as Positive Influence on Education but Negative on Morality in Emerging and Developing Nations,” PewGlobal, March 19, 2015, www.pewglobal.org/2015/03/19/internet-seen-as-positive-influence-on-education-but-negative-influence-on-morality-in-emerging-and-developing-nations.

· #1

The details of Trakhtman’s biography are largely drawn from the memoirs published online by the Vinitsky family; Trakhtman was a friend of the family for decades. See: http://arkady-vinitsky-100years.weebly.com; also, see Russian Jewish Encyclopedia, http://www.rujen.ru.

· #2

Konstantin Kalachev, V kruge tretiem [In the Third Circle]. Kalachev worked as a researcher at Marfino from 1947 to 1996, and in 1999 he wrote a history of the Marfino project. When the authors of this book called the Research Institute of Automation (http://niia.ru/eng.htm), a successor to the sharashka that occupies the building in Marfino to this day, we were told that Kalachev’s book is the only authoritative source of information. The book was published and is available only at http://anmal.narod.ru/kniga/kniga.html.

· #3

The general was Foma Zhelezov, chief of the department in the security service in charge of developing various kinds of technology, from radios and weapons to listening devices. Lev Kopelev, Utili moi pechaly [Soothe My Sorrows] (Moscow: Novaya Gazeta, 2011), 234.

· #4

Editorial, “Ob Odnoy antipatrioticheskoy gruppe teatralnikh critikov” [About one group of unpatriotic theatrical critics], Pravda, January 28, 1949, www.ihst.ru/projects/sohist/books/cosmopolit/100.htm.

· #5

Kopelev, Utili moi pechaly [Soothe My Sorrows], 239.

· #6

Vladimir Fridkin, interview with authors, September 2014.

· #7

Chester Carlson, an American physicist and inventor, created a dry photocopying technique in 1938 and patented his invention on October 6, 1942. US Patent, US 2297691 A, via Google Patents, www.google.com/patents/US2297691.

· #8

Joseph Stalin, “Pechat kak Kollektivny Organizator” [The Press as Collective Organizer], Pravda, May 6, 1923.

· #9

Yevgenia Albats, The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia—Past, Present, and Future (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1994), 234. A photocopy of the document is in the Russian edition of the book, Mina zamedlennogo deistvia. Politichesky portret KGB (Moscow, 1992), 314.

· #10

Rimantas Pleikis, “Radiocenzura” [Radio Censorship], Agentura.ru, 2003, www.agentura.ru/equipment/radiocenzura.

· #11

Maria Orlova (Kopelev’s daughter), interview with authors, October 2014.

· #12

Yuri Andropov, “Ob Ispolzovanii evreiskimi natcionalistami mezjnudarodnogo telephonnogo kanala svyazi” [About the Use of International Phone Calls by Jewish Nationalists], order No. 1428-A, June 1975, quoted in Evreiskaya emigratsia v svete novikh documentov, ed. B. Morozov, 41–44 (Tel Aviv: The Cummings Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1998).

· #13

Ibid., 41–44.

· #14

Ibid.

· #15

Alexander Paritsky, communications with authors, October 2014.

· #16

Gennady Kudryavtsev, interview with authors, October 2014.

· #17

In 1989 Kudryavtsev finally found a way to bypass the restrictions. Denis Thatcher, the husband of British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, was a counsel to Cable & Wireless, the British telecom company. Kudryavtsev suggested to him that they launch a joint project in Moscow to establish dozens of phone boxes for automatic international connection in hotels and airports. The project was given a green light, and once again automatic international calls were possible from Moscow, at least in a very limited way. But the hour was late; these were the final years before the Soviet collapse.

· #18

Edward Fredkin, interview with authors, October 2014.

· #19

Yevgeny Velikhov, interview with authors, September to November 2014.

· #1

For details of the history of Kurchatov Institute see “Kurchatov Institute: Current Life of the Institute Celebrating Jubilees,” www.iter.org/doc/www/content/com/Lists/Stories/Attachments/1575/Kurchatov_Institute.pdf.

· #2

Velikhov, interview with authors, September 2014.

· #3

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf: Memoirs of a Literary Life (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 142.

· #4

At the same time, Alexandrov hid a fact about his past that could have called into question his loyalty: when he was sixteen years old, he joined the White Army and fought the Communists during the Russian Civil War. Anatoly P. Alexandrov, Akademik Anatoly Petrovich Alexandrov: Pryamaya Rech [Academician Anatoly Alexandrov: Direct Speech] (Moscow: Nauka, 2002), 15.

· #5

Bardin, interview with authors, August 2014; and recollections of Demos employees published at http://news.demos.su/private/demos.html.

· #6

Alexey Soldatov and Valery Bardin, interviews with authors, August–October 2014.

· #7

The programmers from Kurchatov Institute worked in conjuction with colleagues at the Ministry of Car Manufacturing.

· #8

Soldatov and Velikhov, interviews with authors, September 2014.

· #29

Bardin, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #10

The headquarters of the Twelfth Department on Varsonofyevsky Lane was first described in Boris Gulko, Yuri Felshtinsky, Vladimir Popov, and Viktor Kortschnoi, “The KGB Plays Chess: The Soviet Secret Police and the Fight for the World Chess Crown,” Russell Enterprises, 2010.

· #11

Andrei Bykov (deputy director of the FSB from 1992 to 1998), interview with authors, September 2014.

· #12

Kalgin’s activities are described in a report of the KGB internal comission investigating the events of August 1991 under director Vadim Bakatin. The report, made public in 2000, is available at http://shieldandsword.mozohin.ru/documents/solution.htm. A photocopy of the report of one of the women, Tatyana Lanina, was published by Yevgenia Albats in the Russian version of her book, Mina zamedlennogo deistvia. Politichesky portret KGB (Moscow, 1992), later published in English as The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia—Past, Present, and Future (New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux, 1994).

· #13

The account is based on the book written by Urushadze Georgy, “Izbrannie mesta iz perepiski s vragami” [Selected Passages from Correspondence with Enemies] (St. Petersburg: European House, 1995), 348–349. After the putsch Urushadze was given access to the documentation of the internal investigation of the KGB and put copies of employees’ reports of the Twelfth Department in the book.

· #14

T. A. Lapina, E. B. Kuznetsova, E. V. Timofeeva, and E. A. Volodchenko reported personally to Kalgin and the head of the controllers. Then, at Kalgin’s orders, they put the information of interest in the reports to be delivered to Kryuchkov. See Novaya Gazeta, August 6, 2001, http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/55n/n55n-s14.shtml.

· #15

Larry Press, professor of computer information systems at California State University, has posted these messages on a website at the California State University, Dominguez Hills. See som.csudh.edu.

· #16

Larry Press, interview with authors, October 2014.

· #17

Vladimir Bulgak, interview with authors, August, 2014.

· #18

The account is based on the authors’ copy of the indictment of the general prosecutor of the Russian Federation No. 18/6214–01 (the case of the attempt of the coup d’?tat), 158.

· #19

Gennady Kudryavtsev, who had fought so hard to expand the international phone lines into the Soviet Union in 1980, was named communications minister of the Soviet Union in March 1991 by Gorbachev. He was flying to Belgrade on August 19 when the coup attempt began. On his plane a crew commander told Kudryavtsev about the putsch. But he ordered the pilot not to change course. Kudryavtsev apparently decided it was not his fight—he was obviously not Yeltsin’s man, as he was a Gorbachev appointee, and the Union’s ministers were of higher status than members of the republican Russian government. Nor did Kudryavtsev want to support the putsch led by the KGB. As Moscow was gripped in uncertainty, Kudryavtsev remained far away in Belgrade. Kudryavtsev, Nepridumannaya Zhizn [Not Invented Life] (Moscow: self-published, 2009).

· #20

Kalgin’s testimony before the internal investigation conducted by the KGB, published in: Urushadze Georgy “Izbrannie mesta iz perepiski s vragami” [Selected Passages from Correspondence with Enemies] (St. Petersburg: European House, 1995), 347.

· #1

Vladimir Bulgak, interview with authors, September 2014.

· #2

Bulgak, interview with authors, September 2014.

· #3

When Bulgak presented the same question to his predecessor, Kudryavtsev, he got a truthful response. Technically it could have been done, Kudryavtsev told Bulgak. The real obstacle was not money or technology but rather pressure from the KGB.

· #4

Larry Press, interview with authors, November 2014.

· #5

Anatoly Levenchuk, interviews and communications with authors, August and September 2014.

· #6

Mikhail Elistratov, interviews with authors, October 2014.

· #7

Joint order of the MGB, MVD, SVR, GUO No. N165/211/29/81, “On Approval and Enactment of the Temporary Instruction on the Organization and Tactics of Operational and Technical Measures,” June 22, 1992; also, Order of the Communications Ministry No. 226, “On the Use of Means of Communication for Search Operations of the Ministry of Security of the Russian Federation,” June 24, 1994.

· #8

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: The Restoration of the Russian Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010).

· #9

The prosecutor’s jurisdiction was limited by a stipulation in a February 1995 law, “On Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation,” Article 24: “Information regarding people who provide or have provided FSB organs with confidential assistance regarding the organization, tactics, methods, and means of implementing the activity of FSB organs shall not be subject to oversight by the prosecutor’s office.”

· #10

The statement of the State Duma on the publication of Sergei Parkhomenko, April 8, 1995, www.bestpravo.ru/rossijskoje/lj-akty/f9r.htm.

· #11

Sergei Parkhomenko, interview with authors, November 2014.

· #12

Mikhail Shevelev (chief of the political department at the time), interview with authors, October 2014.

· #13

Ibid.

· #14

Sergei Parkhomenko, “Bashnya Merlina” [Merlin’s Tower], Moscow News, April 25, May 3, 1995.

· #15

Based on authors’ conversation with an officer who was put in charge of “supervising” Segodnya.

· #1

Vika Egorova, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #2

Anatoly Levenchuk, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #3

The document, in Russian, can be found at www.libertarium.ru/l_sorm_sormprojo.

· #4

Anatoly Levenchuk, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #5

Only one company resisted, in the southern city of Volgograd. The chief executive, Nail Murzakhanov, came under intense pressure. Eventually he left Volgograd and moved to St. Petersburg.

· #6

Gusev, communications with authors, August 8, 2014.

· #7

Decree No. 252, Ministry of Communications, the Russian Federation, signed by Vladimir Bulgak, minister of communications.

· #8

Boris Goldstein, interview with Borogan, September 2014.

· #9

Sergei Mishenkov, interview with Soldatov, August 2014.

· #10

We found several articles online by Vitaly Vekhov about SORM in journals close to the secret services, Zashita informatsii Inside [Protection of Information, Inside] and Operativno-Rosysknoe Pravo [Operation-Research Law: The Volume of the Volgograd Academy of the Interior Ministry]. Vekhov is a criminologist from Volgograd with a long and successful career in Russian law enforcement agencies, ending at the central apparatus of the Investigative Committee of Russia in Moscow. In all his work he repeats that “the formal emergence of SORM took place in the mid 1980s when one of the KGB’s Research Institutes finalized its tactical and technical guidelines.” When we contacted Vekhov, he replied to an e-mail, confirming that development of SORM started in the 1980s. When we asked what particular KGB research facility he meant, he replied simply, “Kuchino NII of the KGB.”

· #11

In August 1955 the chairman of the KGB, Ivan Serov, turned the Kuchino laboratory into the Central Scientific-Research Institute of Special Equipment, or, by its Russian acronym, TsNIIST.

· #12

KGB agents posing as laborers bugged the US Embassy in Moscow during its construction in the 1970s. When discovered in the early 1980s, it was found that even the concrete columns were riddled with bugs, and the eight-story, cubic monolith became known as an “Eight-Story Microphone.” The building was abandoned and the case seemed to have no solution until 1991 when Vadim Bakatin, the head of the KGB at the time, gave an order to present US Ambassador Robert Strauss with the blueprints for the embassy bugs. In July 2000, after a complete renovation, including a new top to the building, it was finally opened.

· #13

On May 27, 1995, Valentin Stepankov, the general prosecutor of Russia, issued order No. 21/13/20, which established that permissions to conduct surveillance were to be issued by the general prosecutor and his deputies and main military prosecutor.

· #14

Based on authors’ conversations with former KGB technical officers.

· #15

Sergei Koval, interview with authors, Speech Technologies Center, June 2009.

· #16

According to the testimony provided by Kalgin before the internal investigation comission of the KGB in 1991. The testimony was quoted by Andrei Uglanov, “Na Lybyanke posle putsha” [On Lubyanka After the Putsch], Argumenti Nedeli, Moscow, August 17, 2011.

· #17

Urushadze Georgy, Izbrannie mesta iz perepiski s vragami [Selected Passages from Correspondence with Enemies] (St. Petersburg: European House, 1995), 349–350. After the putsch Urushadze was given access to the documentation of the internal investigation of the KGB and put copies of employees’ reports of the Twelfth Department in his book.

· #18

Kalgin’s testimony before the internal investigation commission of the KGB on the events of August 1991, quoted by Andrei Uglanov, “Na Lybyanke posle putsha” [On Lubyanka After the Putsch], Argumenti Nedeli, Moscow, August 17, 2011.

· #19

The description of Stasi’s wiretapping system is based on information provided by Detlev Vreisleben, an informal historian of Stasi surveillance equipment who works in Stasi archives, for our website Agentura.ru, www.agentura.ru/museum/melton/stasitapping.

· #1

On September 9, 1999, shortly after midnight, between six and eight hundred pounds of explosives detonated on the ground floor of an apartment building on Guryanova Street in southeast Moscow. The nine-story building was destroyed, killing 94 people and injuring 249. On September 13 a large bomb exploded at 5 a.m. in the basement of an apartment block on Kashirskoye Highway in southern Moscow: 118 people died, and 200 injured.

· #2

Boris Yeltsin, Midnight Diaries (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000), 289–298.

· #3

Elena Tregubova, Baiki kremlevskogo diggera [Tales of a Kremlin Digger] (Moscow: Ad Marginem, 2003), 197.

· #4

On the loan, the bank refused to accept the domestic currency bonds, known as OVVZs. OVVZ bonds were issued by Vnesheconombank, so the bank in fact refused to accept its own securities. Andrei Zolotov Jr., “Media Say Aides Keep Yeltsin in Dark,” Moscow Times, July 29, 1999, www.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/1999/7/article/media-say-aides-keep-yeltsin-in-dark/274376.html.

· #5

Tregubova, Baiki kremlevskogo diggera, 196–197.

· #6

Sergei Parkhomenko, interview with authors, November 2014.

· #7

NTV, “Geroi Dnya” [Hero of the Day], interview with Vladimir Putin, August 9, 1999, http://tvoygolos.forum-tvs.ru/elita/elitatext/1999.08.09.htm.

· #8

Nataliya Gevorkyan, Natalya Timakova, and Andrei Kolesnikov, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000), 83.

· #9

Mikhail Shevelev, interview with authors, November 2014.

· #10

Tregubova, Baiki kremlevskogo diggera, 163–166.

· #11

Gevorkyan, Timakova, and Kolesnikov, First Person.

· #12

Putin visited Finland October 22–23, 1999. For details, see NTV reportage, 1999, www.youtube.com/watch?v=PYMng6H7WCo.

· #13

Alexander Chudodeev, “Inakomislyashchy” [Dissident], an interview with Pavlovsky, Itogi, December 12, 2012, www.itogi.ru/spetzproekt/2012/49/184673.html.

· #14

Gleb Pavlovsky, interview with authors, October 2014.

· #15

Tregubova, Baiki kremlevskogo diggera, 216.

· #16

Putin’s statement at the FSB headquarters, December 20, 1999, YouTube (in Russian, with English subtitles), www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qb63vKtCvRo.

· #17

Oleg Rykov, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #18

The nongovernmental organization was the Russian Institute of Public Networks (ROSNIIROS).

· #19

Alexey Platonov, interview with authors, September 2014.

· #20

Alexey Soldatov, interview with authors, July–September 2014.

· #21

The text of the draft is available on the site of libertarium.ru, www.libertarium.ru/gvt-names.

· #22

Anton Nossik, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #23

Platonov, interview with authors, September 2014.

· #24

See Anton Nossik’s LiveJournal.com entry, http://dolboeb.livejournal.com/2682401.html.

· #1

Dmitry Pavlov, “Vzyali Vladimira Gusinskogo” [Gusinsky is Caught], Kommersant, June 13, 2000, www.kommersant.ru/doc/17059.

· #2

Shenderovich, interview with authors, December 2014. See also Victor Shenderovich, Zdes bylo NTV [Here Was NTV] (Moscow: Zakharov, 2004).

· #3

Oleg Lurie was a good example of such journalism. He became famous in 1999 by exposing corruption in the Kremlin’s renovations. In the early 2000s his “investigations” were published by Versiya and Novaya Gazeta, and he liked to drive a shining new BMW 7. In 2008 he was convicted and imprisoned for extortion; he had requested $50,000 from a senator in exchange for removing kompromat about him from the Internet. He was released in 2011 and immediately launched the journal Jins (slang, a paid journalistic story).

· #4

Andrei Soldatov, Kremlin.com, Index on Censorship, no. 1, 2010, http://ioc.sagepub.com/content/39/1/71.abstract.

· #5

Agentura.ru was inspired by the Federation of American Scientists Secrecy Project led by Steven Aftergood and was supported by the Relcom ISP from September 2000 to the spring of 2006.

· #6

A group of FSB officers arrived at the editorial offices of Versiya claiming they were looking for information published in an article by Soldatov in May 2002 about the construction of residential apartment complexes on the premises of former FSB special facilities in Moscow.

· #7

Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, Marina Latysheva, and Anna Stavitskaya, Journalisti i terrorism [Journalists and Terrorism] (Moscow: Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, 2008).

· #8

ComScore, “Worldwide Search Top 10,” December 2007, Total World Age 15+, Home and Work Locations, January 23, 2008, www.comscore.com/Insights/Press-Releases/2008/01/Baidu-Ranked-Third-Largest-World-Wide-Search-Engine.

· #9

Lev Gershenzon, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #10

Gershenzon was summoned to the meeting with Surkov and Kostin by Dmitry Ivanov, a projects director of Yandex. Before Yandex, Ivanov had worked in Pavlovsky’s foundation and succeeded Marina Litvinovich as chief of the FEP Internet department, when she was given Strana.ru to run.

· #11

Steve Gutterman, “Russia’s Putin Brings ‘Gray Cardinal’ Surkov Back to Kremlin,” Reuters, September 20, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/us-russia-surkov-idUSBRE98J0VK20130920.

· #12

Surkov first used the term “sovereign democracy” on February 22, 2006, in a speech before the Russian political party United Russia. According to Surkov, sovereign democracy is “a society’s political life where the political powers, their authorities, and decisions are decided and controlled by a diverse Russian nation for the purpose of reaching material welfare, freedom, and fairness by all citizens, social groups, and nationalities by the people that formed it.” See also Masha Lipman, “Putin’s ‘Sovereign Democracy,’” Washington Post, July 15, 2006, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/14/AR2006071401534.html.

· #13

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “A Face in the Crowd: The FSB Is Watching You!” OpenDemocracy, November 15, 2011, www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrei-soldatov-irina-borogan/face-in-crowd-fsb-is-watching-you.

· #14

In spring 2007 Estonia had angered the Kremlin with its decision to move a Soviet war memorial out of the center of the capital. After a massive nationalistic campaign against Estonia in the Russian press, on April 27 Russian hackers launched a series of cyber attacks on the websites of the Estonian government, parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers, and broadcasters. Most of the attacks were the distributed-denial-of-service type. Estonian foreign minister Urmas Paet accused the Kremlin of direct involvement, and Estonia requested and received NATO assistance in responding to this new form of aggression. But Estonia failed to present proof of the Russian government’s involvement, and in September 2007 the country’s defense minister admitted he had no evidence linking cyber attacks to the Russian authorities. Two years later, in May 2009, Konstantin Goloskokov, one of the “commissars” of the pro-Kremlin Nashi movement, admitted to the Financial Times that he and some of his associates had launched the DDOS attacks on Estonia in 2007. See Charles Clover, “Kremlin-Backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz,” Financial Times, March 11, 2009, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57536d5a-0ddc-11de-8ea3–0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3QDihM3bC. In September 2013, Novaya Gazeta journalists infiltrated the “trolls factory” and published the investigation. The “factory” was based in a mansion near the rail station Olgino, outside of St. Petersburg, and was led by Alexey Soskovets, once involved in Nashi and Molodaya Gvardiya. See also Alexandra Garmazhalova, “Gde zhivut trolli. I kto ih kormit” [Where the Trolls Live. And Who Feeds Them], Novaya Gazeta, September 9, 2013, www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/59889.html.

· #15

Nathan Hodge, “Kremlin Launches ‘School of Bloggers,’” Wired.com, May 27, 2009.

· #16

These two cable operators were Akado and Stream, owned by Victor Vekselberg and Vladimir Evtushenkov, respectively.

· #17

Mikhail Zygar, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #18

Julia Ioffe, “Net Impact,” New Yorker, April 4, 2011, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/04/04/net-impact.

· #19

Navalny blog, “Kak pilyat v Transnefti” [How They Are Sawing at Transneft], November 16, 2010, http://navalny.livejournal.com/526563.html.

· #20

“Pravila zhisni, Alexey Navalny” [Rules of Life, Alexey Navalny], Esquire, December 2011, http://esquire.ru/wil/alexey-navalny.

· #21

Kremlin.ru, transcripts, Speech at Meeting with Russian and Singaporean Business Communities, November 16, 2009, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/10449.

· #22

“Pravila zhisni.”

· #1

Transcript of the meeting of the National Antiterrorism Committee, February 22, 2011, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/1804.

· #2

Video of Putin’s remarks in Votkinsk, YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tr-jIPUZPOk. Also see “Russia’s Putin Sees No ‘Logic or Conscience’ in US Air Strikes on Libya,” Interfax, March 21, 2001, and “Putin Likens UN Libya Resolution to Crusade Call,” RIA Novosti, March 21, 2011.

· #3

Josh Halliday, “Hillary Clinton Adviser Compares Internet to Che Guevara,” Guardian, June 22, 2011, www.theguardian.com/media/2011/jun/22/hillary-clinton-adviser-alec-ross.

· #4

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “The Russian State and Surveillance Technology,” OpenDemocracy, October 25, 2011, www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrei-soldatov-irina-borogan/russian-state-and-surveillance-technology.

· #5

Yuri Sinodov, interview with authors, April 2011.

· #6

On June 2, 2010, the service invited tenders for contract No.147/I/1–133, worth up to 450,000 rubles, for the procurement of software. The contract called for an information-analysis system called “Semantic Archive,” produced by the company Analytic Business Solutions.

· #7

Denis Shatrov, interview with authors, September 2011.

· #8

Natalia Sindeeva, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #9

Medvedev’s appearance on TV Dozhd, YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=SwmvvjyhXmY.

· #10

Mikhail Zygar, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #11

Komsomolskaya Pravda radio broadcast, August 1, 2011.

· #12

Zygar, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #13

Alexander Podrabinek, “Boris Nemtsov on the Rokirovka in the Tandem: It’s the Worst Scenario for Russia,” RFI, September 24, 2011, http://ru.rfi.fr/rossiya/20110924-boris-nemtsov-o-rokirovke-v-rossiiskom-vlastnom-tandeme-eto-khudshii-stsenarii-dlya.

· #14

Nemtsov visited the United States on September 15–16, 2011, to take part in a panel at the Harriman Institute on the Russian elections. The video is available at YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZemHhZcpKsQ.

· #15

Grigory Melkonyants, interview with authors, June 2013.

· #16

Ilya Azar, “Karusel slomalas” [Carousel Is Broken], Lenta.ru, December 4, 2011.

· #17

Lev Gershenzon, interview with authors, January 2015.

· #18

Grigory Okhotin, interview with authors, June 2014.

· #19

Ilya Klishin, interview with authors, October 2014.

· #20

This account is based on authors’ interview with Parkhomenko, Klishin, and Saprykin, January 2015.

· #21

Stanislav Sedov, interview with authors, July 2012. See also Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Big Brother, Little Drones—Protestors Beware,” OpenDemocracy, July 23, 2012, www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrei-soldatov-irina-borogan/big-brother-little-drones-protestors-beware.

· #1

Nossik’s post, https://dolboeb.livejournal.com/2242130.html.

· #2

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “The Kremlin and the Hackers: Partners in Crime?” OpenDemocracy, April 25, 2012, www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/irina-borogan-andrei-soldatov/kremlin-and-hackers-partners-in-crime.

· #3

Vadim Petrov (technical manager of Slon.ru), interview with authors, April 2012.

· #4

According to a report by Highload Lab company, the owners of Qrator service, posted on the site of Habrahabr, the community of geeks in Russia, http://habrahabr.ru/company/highloadlab/blog/134124.

· #5

For more details, see Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB, ch. 18, “Hackers” (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010).

· #6

“Kremlin-Backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz,” Financial Times, March 11, 2009, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/57536d5a-0ddc-11de-8ea3–0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3QDihM3bC.

· #7

Eugene Kaspersky personal blog, “Vibori, vibori—ddosyat-3” [Elections, Elections, Sites Are Under DDOS-3], December 16, 2011, https://eugene.kaspersky.ru/2011/12/16/vybory-vybory-3/.

· #8

The transcript is available on Kot’s blog, https://edvvvard.livejournal.com/56342.html.

· #9

Boris Nemtsov, interview with authors, February 2012. Also see Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Who’s Bugging the Russian Opposition?” OpenDemocracy, February 24, 2012, www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andrei-soldatov-irina-borogan/project-id-who’s-bugging-russian-opposition.

· #10

The transcript was published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, December 15, 2012, www.rg.ru/printable/2011/12/15/stenogramma.html.

· #11

Olga Romanova, interview with authors, March 2013. Alexey Kozlov was finally released in June 2013.

· #12

Grigory Okhotin, interview with authors, June 2014.

· #13

The impressive video setup was thanks to the efforts of Yuri Saprykin, editor of Afisha.ru, which had experience in organizing music festivals. Saprykin helped find the equipment for sound and video. Yuri Saprykin, interview with authors, February 2015.

· #14

Ilya Klishin, interview with authors, October 2014.

· #15

The Masterskaya club is owned by a prominent family, Paperny, famous among the Moscow liberal intelligentsia.

· #16

“FSB obeshaet ochistit Runet ot vozdeistvia zapadnikh spetszluzhb” [FSB Promises Clean Runet of Foreign Intelligence Services], Vedomosti, March 27, 2012, www.vedomosti.ru/technology/news/2012/03/27/fsb_obeschaet_ochistit_runet_ot_vozdejstviya_zarubezhnyh.

· #17

The new system of filtering was modeled on the one used to block extremist and terrorist bank accounts in Russia. Three government agencies—Roskomnadzor (the Agency for the Supervision of Information Technology, Communications and Mass Media), the Federal Anti-Drug Agency, and the Federal Service for the Supervision of Consumer Rights and Public Welfare—submit data for the government’s blacklist of sites. Roskomnadzor is in charge of compiling and updating the register and is also responsible for instructing host providers to remove the URLs. If no action by the host provider follows, the ISPs are required to block access to the site within twenty-four hours. The host providers must also ensure they are not in breach of current law by checking their content against the database of outlawed sites and URLs published in a special password-protected online version of the register open only to web hosters and ISPs. Since November 2012 thousands of websites have been banned from the Russian Internet; the Internet monitoring law has had some substantial offline consequences as well. Institutions providing public access to the Internet—schools, libraries, Internet caf?s, and even post offices—have been targeted for law enforcement inspections to check for computers containing software that might allow access to banned websites.

· #18

Irina Levova and Mikhail Yakushev (a vice president of ICANN for Russia, present at the meeting), interviews with authors, July–October 2014.

· #19

Ilya Ponomarev, interview with authors, September 2012. See also Agentura.ru, September 26, 2012, http://agentura.ru/projects/identification/iponomarev.

· #20

Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “The Kremlin’s New Internet Surveillance Plan Goes Live Today,” Wired.com, November 1, 2012, www.wired.com/2012/11/russia-surveillance.

· #21

The video was considered insulting to Muslims and includes cartoonish scenes depicting the prophet as a buffoon, a womanizer, and a greedy thug, among other things.

· #22

YouTube was made inaccessible in Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, and the Stavropol Region.

· #23

For details, see Soldatov and Borogan, “The Kremlin’s New Internet Surveillance Plan Goes Live Today.” The mobile operators in Russia came up with the idea of traffic “shaping,” a euphemism that means by using DPI technology, they could, if they wished, suppress particular services—in most cases torrents, peer-to-peer protocols, and Skype, which poses a threat to the voice-over Internet protocol services offered by the mobile operators themselves.

· #24

See details of the meeting in our investigation: Soldatov and Borogan, “The Kremlin’s New Internet Surveillance Plan Goes Live Today.”

· #25

Volkov and Saprykin had come to see Zygar at noon, and by 3:00 p.m., Zygar secured approval from Sindeeva, and by 11:00 p.m. of the same day, Zygar, Volkov, and Saprykin sat at the caf? on Nikitskaya Street to talk over the technicalities. They also invited Demian Kudryavtsev, a former CEO of Kommersant publishing house; Zygar intended to ask him to cohost the debate along with Saprykin. Kudryavtsev eagerly supported the idea.

· #26

Yuri Saprykin, “O teledebatakh na Dozhde” [On the TV Debates at Dozhd], Rambler-Afisha, October 17, 2012, http://gorod.afisha.ru/archive/sluchai-saprykin-teledebaty.

· #1

Konstantin Kalachev, V kruge tretiem [In the Third Circle]. Kalachev worked as a researcher at Marfino from 1947 to 1996, and in 1999 he wrote a history of the Marfino project. The book never made it into print and is available only on the site: http://anmal.narod.ru/kniga/kniga.html.

· #2

Lev Kopelev, Utili moi pechaly [Soothe My Sorrows] (Moscow: Novaya Gazeta, 2011).

· #3

In the uncensored edition of The First Circle, Solzhenitsyn carefully changed all the names except for the betrayed Soviet spy Koval; apparently he thought it was not a real name. As it turned out, he was wrong.

· #4

In June 1997 Kopelev died in Cologne. A few months before, in January 1997, in Moscow, Solzhenitsyn went back to Marfino—as a visitor. The visit needed weeks of negotiations, as it remains a highly secret facility, manned by what was then called FAPSI, the Russian electronic intelligence agency. On January 16, 1997, the gates opened to let in Solzhenitsyn’s cherry-red Volvo. Solzhenitsyn was full of memories. “I never thought I could visit this place again. I walked and couldn’t stop, in some rooms—incredibly!—everything is as it was then.” Eventually he was shown into the large room where over five hundred employees gathered. In 1997 Marfino suffered three months’ delay in payment of salaries, and the employees asked Solzhenitsyn anxiously, “What should we do? Does our country need us?” They called him a colleague. The only media report from the meeting said, “They felt in today’s Solzhenitsyn an accomplice and applauded.” Vladimir Umnov, “Solzhenitsyn snova v sharashke” [Solzhenitsyn Is Again in Sharashka], Ogonyok, January 27, 1997, www.ogoniok.com/archive/1997/4487/04–20–21.

· #5

Gunnar Fant, Acoustic Theory of Speech Production (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton and Co, N.V. Publishers), 1960.

· #6

Gunnar Fant, Akusticheskaya teoria recheobrazovania [Acoustic Theory of Speech Production] (Moscow: Nauka, 1964).

· #7

Fant’s autobiography on the site of the Department of Speech, Music and Hearing of KTH Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, founded by Fant. Gunnar Fant, “Half a Century in Phonetics and Speech Research,” www.speech.kth.se/gunnarfant/halfcentury.pdf.

· #8

Sergei Koval, interview with authors, January 2012.

· #9

Vladimir Chuchupal, interview with authors, September 2014.

· #10

Loren Graham, conversations with authors, September 2013.

· #11

Anatoly Levenchuk, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #12

Ibid.

· #13

“Chuzadas no fueron hechas por el DAS: Felipe Mu?oz” [Wiretappings Were Not Made by the DAS: Felipe Mu?oz], Vanguardia, September 22, 2009, www.vanguardia.com/historico/40371-chuzadas-no-fueron-hechas-por-el-das-felipe-munoz.

· #14

For details, see Camilla Pease-Watkin, “DAS Scandal ‘Worse than Watergate,’” Colombia Reports, June 18, 2010, http://colombiareports.co/us-report-das-scandal-worse-than-watergate, and the text of the report, “Far Worse than Watergate Widening Scandal Regarding Colombia’s Intelligence Agency,” prepared by the Latin America Working Group Education Fund, US Office on Colombia, Center for International Policy and Washington Office on Latin America, www.lawg.org/storage/colombia/farworsethanwatergatefinalfinal.pdf, and Joshua Goodman, “Ex-Spy Chief Wanted in Colombia for Wiretaps Surrenders,” Associated Press, January 31, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/spy-chief-wanted-colombia-wiretaps-surrenders-28625517.

· #15

“Chuzadas no fueron hechas por el DAS: Felipe Mu?oz” [Wiretappings Were Not Made by the DAS: Felipe Mu?oz]. See also SpeechPro’s press release, “STC Expert Helped Justifying Colombian Security Department,” October 6, 2009, http://speechpro.com/media/news/2009–10–06.

· #16

Chris Kraul, “Colombia Spy Chief Works to Clean Up Agency,” Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/22/world/la-fg-colombia-das-qa-20100423.

· #17

William Romero, a former senior official of Colombia’s DAS security service, told radio stations that he received orders from then DAS director Maria del Pilar Hurtado—who went into exile in Panama in the summer of 2014—to spy on Supreme Court justices. He also said that the main intended recipient of transcripts of the intercepted communication was ex-President ?lvaro Uribe. For details, see EFE, “Uribe Ordered Illegal Wiretaps, Former Colombian Spy Says,” Latin American Herald Tribune, August 1, 2014, www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=381815&CategoryId=12393.

· #18

“WikiLeaks: The Spy Files,” www.wikileaks.org/the-spyfiles.html.

· #19

Vadim Sekeresh, interview with authors, December 2011.

· #1

“Glava Roskomnadzora na peredache Hard day’s night” [Head of Roskomnadzor at the Broadcast of Hard Day’s Night], TV Dozhd, November 20, 2012, http://tvrain.ru/articles/glava_roskomnadzora_ob_obyskah_u_malofeeva_ekspertah_po_detskoj_pornografii_i_chernyh_spiskah_interneta-333188.

· #2

YouTube was blocked in the mostly Muslim republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia, Karachay-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, and the Stavropol Region.

· #3

The account is based on Alexey Afanasyev, interviews with authors, September and October 2014.

· #4

Konstantin Poleskov, “Eto bylo nechto!” [It Was Something!], Novaya Gazeta, April 8, 2013, www.novayagazeta.ru/society/57539.html.

· #5

Ilya Azar, “I Don’t Appeal to Build a Dictatorship,” interview with Kaspersky, Lenta.ru, October 1, 2013.

· #6

Andrei Soldatov, “What Russia Censored in March,” Index on Censorship, April 30, 2013, http://uncut.indexoncensorship.org/2013/04/what-russia-censored-in-march.

· #7

“Administratsia Twittera aktivno vkluchilas v sotrudnichestvo s Reestrom zapreshennoi k rasprostaneniyu v Rossii informatcii” [Administration of Twitter Actively Involved in Cooperation with the Register of Information Forbidden to Disseminate in Russia], Roskomnadzor statement, March 19, 2013, http://06.rkn.gov.ru/news/news48104.htm.

· #8

Andrew E. Kramer, “Russians Selectively Blocking Internet,” New York Times, March 31, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/technology/russia-begins-selectively-blocking-internet-content.html.

· #9

9M. Ksenzov remarks, enlarged meeting of the board of Roskomnadzor, May 14, 2013, http://rkn.gov.ru/press/developments/speech/news19962.htm.

· #10

A. A. Zharov remarks, enlarged meeting of the board of Roskomnadzor, May 14, 2013, http://rkn.gov.ru/press/developments/speech/news19962.htm.

· #11

Jeffrey Peterson, “Safe Internet League Established in Russia,” EWDN, February 11, 2011, www.ewdn.com/2011/02/15/safe-internet-league-established-in-russia.

· #12

“LBI: Russkoyazichny segment interneta stanovitsa chishe” [The Safe Internet League: The Russian Segment of the Internet Is Getting Cleaner], Refnews.ru, March 2, 2015, www.refnews.ru/read/article/1061481.

· #13

The official site of the project is http://mediagvardia.ru.

· #14

Statement by Edward Snowden to human rights groups at Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport, WikiLeaks, July 12, 2013, https://wikileaks.org/Statement-by-Edward-Snowden-to.html.

· #15

Transcript of the press conference of Vladimir Putin with president of Finland Sauli Niinist?, June 25, 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5646.

· #16

News conference following the working meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) summit, the transcript on the site of the Kremlin, July 1, 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5666.

· #17

Andrew E. Kramer, “Rights Group Says Its Researcher in Moscow Is Threatened,” New York Times, October 4, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/world/europe/human-rights-watch-says-its-moscow-researcher-threatened.html.

· #18

The account below is based on Tanya Lokshina, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #19

The e-mail was provided to authors by Lokshina.

· #20

Sergei Nikitin, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #21

Andrew Roth and David M. Herszenhorn, “Russian Authorities Raid Amnesty International Office,” New York Times, March 25, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/world/europe/russian-authorities-raid-amnesty-international-office.html?_r=0.

· #22

On May 12, 2007, the FSB’s Public Relations Center announced that the agency had created a “Public Council” to be geared toward “developing cooperation between security agencies and academic organizations and Russian citizens in providing national security, protecting the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens as well as the constitutional order.” Nikolai Patrushev, then FSB director, said the task of the council is to provide cooperation between the FSB and NGOs as well as Russian citizens. In reality the Public Council has no power and was intended to be a purely consultative body. Apparently the main task of the Public Council is to improve the image of the FSB, as was confirmed to Andrei Soldatov by Andrei Przhedomsky, a member of the Council. For details, see “Public Council at the FSB Established,” Agentura.ru, www.agentura.ru/english/timeline/2007/publiccouncil.

· #23

Ekaterina Grigorieva, “Rossia profinansiruet evropeiskuyu demorkatiyu” [Russia Will Fund the European Democracy], Izvestia, October 29, 2007, http://izvestia.ru/news/330162. For details in English, see Nikola Krastev, “In the Heart of New York, Russia’s ‘Soft Power’ Arm Gaining Momentum,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, February 14, 2015, www.rferl.org/content/In_The_Heart_Of_New_York_Russias_Soft_Power_Arm_Gaining_Momentum/1493429.html.

· #24

Miriam Elder, “Russia Needs to Reclaim Its ‘Digital Sovereignty’ from US, says MP,” Guardian, June 19, 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/19/russia-digital-soveriegnty-nsa-surveillance.

· #25

Interview to Channel One and Associated Press news agency, the transcript on the site of the Kremlin, September 4, 2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5935.

· #26

Vladislav Novy, “Spetsluzbi ne vpisalis v traffik” [Secret Services Didn’t Make into Traffic], Kommersant, October 24, 2013, www.kommersant.ru/doc/2326973.

· #27

Andrei Soldatov, “Russia’s Spying Craze,” Moscow Times, October 31, 2014, www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/russias-spying-craze/488773.html.

· #28

The roundtable on SORM at the MSK-IX conference, with Vartan Khachaturov, deputy director of the infrastructure department at the Ministry of Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation, present, December 10, 2013, YouTube, www.youtube.com/watch?v=JuqiBGhJBtA.

· #29

Transcript, “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin,” Kremlin, April 17, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/7034.

· #30

Ibid.

· #31

Edward Snowden, “Vladimir Putin Must Be Called to Account on Surveillance Just Like Obama,” Guardian, April 18, 2014, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/18/vladimir-putin-surveillance-us-leaders-snowden.

· #32

Marina Zhunich, YouTube, July 18, 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=76KrOhZNsEo.

· #33

Marina Zhunich, conversations with authors, December 2014.

· #34

Irina Yusbekova, “Google [Has] Begun to Relocate the Servers to Russian Data-Centers,” April 10, 2015, RBC Daily.

· #1

“Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security,” introduced by Russia as a draft resolution in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, A/RES/53/70, January 4, 1999.

· #2

Vladimir Markomenko, “Nevidimaya Zatyazhnaya voina” [Invisible Protracted War], Nezevisimaya Gazeta, August 16, 1997. Markomenko was then the first deputy director of FAPSI.

· #3

Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian Federation, Russian Security Council, www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/6/5.html.

· #4

The diplomat who reported this was US charg? d’affaires Hugh Neighbour, reporting March 16, about a meeting in Vienna. “U.S.-RF Cybersecurity Bilateral on Margins of Osce Cyber Workshop,” March 25, 2009, WikiLeaks, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09USOSCE66_a.html.

· #5

In 2010 Kaspersky Lab discovered Stuxnet, the US-Israeli worm that wrecked nearly a thousand Iranian centrifuges. Two years later it exposed Flame, which attacked computers running the Microsoft Windows operating system; the program is being used for targeted cyber espionage in the Middle Eastern countries. Based on Kaspersky Lab’s investigation, experts and journalists found additional evidence that the United States was behind the development of Stuxnet and Flame. For details, see Kaspersky Lab, “Stuxnet Worm: Insight from Kaspersky Lab,” Virus News, September 27, 2010, www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2010/Stuxnet_Worm_Insight_from_Kaspersky_Lab. Andrey Krutskikh referred to Stuxnet at the meeting in Garmisch, 2012; see Adrian Croft, “Russia Says Many States Arming for Cyber Warfare,” Reuters, April 25, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/germany-cyber-idUSL6E8FP40M20120425, and Krutskikh remarks at London Cyber conference on November 11, 2011, the conference Kaspersky also attended: www.rusemb.org.uk/article/112.

· #6

In January 2011 Krutskikh welcomed Andrey Yarnikh, head of Government Relations at Kaspersky Lab, into the Russian delegation at the intergovernmental group on cyber crime of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Open-ended intergovernmental expert group on cybercrime, UNODC, January 21, 2011, www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/EGM_cybercrime_2011/UNODC_CCPCJ_EG4_2011_INF_2_Rev1.pdf.

· #7

Eugene Kaspersky blog, “Call for Action: Internet Should Become a Military-Free Zone,” November 25, 2011, http://eugene.kaspersky.com/2011/11/25/internet-military-free-zone.

· #8

The account is based on authors’ interviews with Russian and American participants of the conference who preferred not to be named.

· #9

John Markoff, “At Internet Conference, Signs of Agreement Appear Between U.S. and Russia,” New York Times, April 15, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/science/16cyber.html?_r=0.

· #10

George Sadowsky, interview with authors, January 2015.

· #11

Markoff, “At Internet Conference.”

· #12

“Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Reaffirms the Russian Federation’s Support for ITU,” ITU News, November 5, 2011, https://itunews.itu.int/En/1444-Prime-Minister-Vladimir-Putin-reaffirms-the-Russian-Federation%C2%92s-support-for-ITU.note.aspx; Jerry Brito, “The Case Against Letting the UN Govern the Internet,” Time, February 13, 2012, http://techland.time.com/2012/02/13/the-case-against-letting-the-united-nations-govern-the-internet; and Leo Kelion, “US Resists Control of Internet Passing to UN Agency,” BBC, August 3, 2012, www.bbc.com/news/technology-19106420.

· #13

“Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Reaffirms the Russian Federation’s Support for ITU.”

· #14

Vinton G. Cerf, “Keep the Internet Open,” New York Times, May 24, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/opinion/keep-the-internet-open.html?_r=0.

· #15

Richard Lardner, “A Battle for Internet Freedom as UN Meeting Nears,” Associated Press, June 22, 2012, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/battle-internet-freedom-un-meeting-nears-0.

· #16

The Russian proposal is dated November 17, 2012, wcitleaks.org, http://files.wcitleaks.org/public/S12-WCIT12-C-0027!R1!MSW-E.pdf.

· #17

Brian Murphy, “Clashes Over Internet Rules to Mark International Conference,” Associated Press, December 3, 2012, www.komonews.com/news/tech/Clashes-over-Internet-rules-to-mark-Dubai-meeting-181860811.html.

· #18

The account is based on authors’ interviews with participants of the conference who preferred not to be named.

· #19

Ambassador Terry Kramer, US Head of Delegation, “Development and Progress of the World Conference on International Telecommunications Currently Being Held in Dubai, United Arab Emirates Until December 14, 2012,” Special Briefing, World Conference on International Telecommunications, Via Teleconference, December 6, 2012, www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/201637.htm.

· #20

The document is available at wcitleaks.org, http://files.wcitleaks.org/public/Merged%20UAE%20081212.pdf.

· #21

Dave Burstein and Grahame Lynch, “WCIT Bombshell: Russia Withdraws Internet Regulation Push, Apparently Under ITU Pressure,” Commsday.com, December 10, 2012, www.commsday.com/commsday-australasia/russia-combines-with-china-arab-states-on-dramatic-internet-regulatory-push.

· #22

AFP, “Confusion on Internet Future After UN Treaty Split,” December 16, 2012, www.securityweek.com/confusion-internet-future-after-un-treaty-split.

· #23

Eric Pfanner, “U.S. Rejects Telecommunications Treaty,” New York Times, December 13, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/technology/14iht-treaty14.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&.

· #24

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Information and Communications Technology Security,” June 17, 2013, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/fact-sheet-us-russian-cooperation-information-and-communications-technol.

· #25

Ewan MacAskill, “Putin Calls Internet a ‘CIA Project’ Renewing Fears of Web Breakup,” Guardian, April 24, 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/vladimir-putin-web-breakup-internet-cia.

· #26

Minkomsvyaz Rossii, “Rabota nad itogovimi documentami NETmundial-2014 neprozrachna” [The Ministry of Communications of Russia: The Work on Resulting Documents of NETmundial 2014 is Nontransparent], April 25, 2014, http://minsvyaz.ru/ru/events/30026.

· #1

Andrew Mitrovica, “The Troublemaker,” UofTMagazine, Autumn 2009, www.magazine.utoronto.ca/autumn-2009/profile-of-u-of-t-citizen-lab-founder-professor-ron-deibert.

· #2

The copy is in authors’ possession.

· #3

UK Office of National Statistics, “Visits to the UK for the London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympics,” April 19, 2013, www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/ott/travel-trends/2012/sty-visits-to-the-uk.html.

· #4

Eli Lake, “Why the FBI Didn’t Make Much of Russia’s Request to Probe Boston Bomber,” Daily Beast, April 22, 2013, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/22/why-the-fbi-didn-t-make-much-of-russia-s-request-to-probe-boston-bomber.html.

· #5

“Kremlin: Russia, US to Step Up Counter-Terrorism Cooperation,” Reuters, NBC, April 20, 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/20/17836295-kremlin-russia-us-to-step-up-counter-terrorism-cooperation.

· #6

David Wise, “The FBI-Russia Connection,” Reuters, May 9, 2013, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/05/09/the-fbi-russia-connection.

· #7

“Britain to Provide Security for Sochi Olympics,” News24 Online, May 11, 2013, http://news24online.com/britain-to-provide-security-for-sochi-olympics.

· #8

The Presidential Executive Order No. 686, “On Peculiarities of Applying Enhanced Security Measures During the XXII Winter Olympic Games and the XI Winter Paralympic Games in Sochi in 2014.” On January 4, 2014, Putin signed Executive Order “On Amendments to the Order 686,” and the amendments allowed the protests during the Games but in a specially designated place—in the park twelve miles from the city and only after they agreed with the Interior Ministry and the FSB. See Kremlin, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6491.

· #9

Fred Weir, “Russia’s Sochi Games: Why You May Want to Leave Your Laptop at Home,” Christian Science Monitor, October 7, 2013, www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2013/1007/Russia-s-Sochi-Games-Why-you-may-want-to-leave-your-laptop-at-home.

· #10

“Let’s Just Put Some Random Words: FSB, Sochi, Spying,” Voice of Russia, October 9, 2013, http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2013_10_09/Let-s-just-put-some-random-words-FSB-Sochi-spying-4373.

· #11

Nikita Sorokin, “Don’t Be Scared of Phone Tapping During Sochi-2014, It’s for Your Own Safety—Experts,” Voice of Russia, October 10, 2013, http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2013_10_10/Dontt-be-scared-of-phone-tapping-during-Sochi-2014-its-for-your-own-safety-experts-5489.

· #12

Ibid.

· #13

The decree No. 1003 “Ob osobennostyakh okazania uslug svyazi i o poryadke vzaimodeistvia operatorov svyazi s upolnomochennimi gosudarstvennimi organami, osushestvlyaushimi operativno-razysknuyu deyatelnost, na territorii g. Sochi v period provedenia XXII Olimpiyskikh zimnikh igr i XI Paralimpiyskikh zimnikh igr 2014 goda v g. Sochi” [Details of the Provision of Telecommunications Services, and on the Interaction of Operators with the State Authorities Conducting Operational Search Activities on the Territory of Sochi During the XXII Olympic Winter Games and XI Paralympic Winter Games of 2014 in Sochi], Rossiyskaya Gazeta, November 8, 2013, www.rg.ru/2013/11/13/opera-site-dok.html.

· #14

Shaun Walker, “MEPs Raise Concerns Over Sochi Winter Olympics Surveillance Plans,” Guardian, November 13, 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/13/meps-concerns-sochi-winter-olympics-surveillance.

· #15

“Islamic Group Claims Volgograd Attacks and Threatens Sochi Visitors,” Associated Press, January 20, 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/20/islamic-group-claims-volgograd-threatens-sochi.

· #16

Nataliya Vasilyeva, interview with authors, March 2014.

· #17

Nikolai Levshits, “Sochi-2014: Zaslon dlya ne loyalnikh” [Sochi 2014: The Wall for Not Loyal], New Times, January 27, 2014.

· #18

Paul Sonne, Gregory L. White, and Joshua Robinson, “Russian Officials Fire Back at Olympic Critics,” Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304680904579366712107461956.

· #19

Umberto Bacchi, “Sochi Winter Olympics: Circassian Protest Website NoSochi2014 Hacked on Games’ Eve,” International Business Times, February 7, 2014, www.ibtimes.co.uk/sochi-winter-olympics-circassian-protest-website-nosochi2014-hacked-games-eve-1435553.

· #20

The account is based on Anastasia Kirilenko, interview with authors, March 2014.

· #21

Joshua Yaffa, “The Waste and Corruption of Vladimir Putin’s 2014 Winter Olympics,” Bloomberg, January 2, 2014, www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014–01–02/the-2014-winter-olympics-in-sochi-cost-51-billion; and Thomas Grove, “Special Report: Russia’s $50 Billion Olympic Gamble,” Reuters, February 21, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/21/us-russia-sochi-idUSBRE91K04M20130221.

· #1

On April 4, 2014, Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry sent a note to Moscow demanding to clarify the circumstances of presence of FSB Colonel-General Sergei Beseda in Kiev on February 20 and 21. The next day the Russian news agency Interfax, citing security sources, confirmed that Sergei Beseda was indeed in the Ukrainian capital on February 20–21, “Russia’s FSB Says Top Officer Went to Kiev for ‘Security,’” AFP, April 5, 2014. For details, see James Marson, “Russia Fails to Make Deeper Inroads in Ukraine—For Now,” Wall Street Journal, April 10, 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303603904579491641537737078.

· #2

Kathy Lally, Will Englund, and William Booth, “Russian Parliament Approves Use of Troops in Ukraine,” Washington Post, March 1, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-parliament-approves-use-of-troops-in-crimea/2014/03/01/d1775f70-a151–11e3-a050-dc3322a94fa7_story.html.

· #3

The archive of NTV coverage is available on the site of NTV, March 1, 2014, www.ntv.ru/2014/03/01.

· #4

Roskomnadzor news, “Po trebaniyu Generalnoy Prokuraturi prekrashen dostup k soobshestvam urkainskikh nationalisticheskikh organizatciy v socialnoy seti ‘VKontakte’” [At the Request of the General Prosecutor’s Office Access Discontinued to Communities of Ukrainian Nationalist Organizations in the Social Network ‘VKontakte’], March 3, 2014, http://rkn.gov.ru/news/rsoc/news24185.htm.

· #5

“Russia Lenta.ru Editor Timchenko Fired in Ukraine Row,” BBC, March 12, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26543464; Roskomnadzor statement could be found here: http://rkn.gov.ru/news/rsoc/news24418.htm.

· #6

Address by president of the Russian Federation, March 18, 2014, Kremlin.ru, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/6889.

· #7

“Ogranichen dostup k ryadu internet-resursov, rasprostranyavshikh prizyvi k nesanktcionirovannim massovim meropriatyam” [Access Restricted to a Number of Internet Resources, Distributing Calls to Unauthorized Mass Event], Roskomnadzor news, March 13, 2014, http://rkn.gov.ru/news/rsoc/news24447.htm.

· #8

Nikita Likhachev, “Genprokuratura zablokirovala blog Navalnogo, saiti Echa Mosckvy, Grani.Ru, Kasparov.Ru I Ezh.Ru” [General Prosecutor’s Office Has Blocked Navalny Blog, the Sites Echo of Moscow, Grani.ru, Kasparov.ru, and EZh.ru], Tjournal.ru, March 13, 2014, http://tjournal.ru/paper/kasparov-grani-ej.

· #9

Viktor Shenderovich, “Putin I devochka na konkakh” [Putin and a Girl on Skates], Ej.ru, February 10, 2014, http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=24384.

· #10

Agora, a human rights group based in Kazan that provides legal advocacy for victims of suspected human rights abuses, with a focus on journalists, political activists, bloggers, and NGOs, provided a lawyer, Damir Gainutdinov, to help the blocked sites in court, but eventually, despite all efforts, they failed.

· #11

Nikita Likhachev, “Polzovateli pozhalovalis na blokirovku saita LifeNews” [Users Complained of the Blocking by the Site LifeNews], Tjournal, March 17, 2014, http://tjournal.ru/paper/lifenews-block.

· #12

Ruslan Leviev, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #13

Leviev’s post on LiveJournal, “Kak rabotaet mechanism blokirovok Roskomnadzora” [How the Mechanism of Blocking by Roskomnadzor Works], April 22, 2014, http://ruslanleviev.livejournal.com/34401.html.

· #14

Ksenia Boletskaya, “Roskomnadzoru pokazivayut kotyat vmesto saita Navalnogo” [Roskomnadzor Is Shown Kittens Instead of the Site of Navalny], Vedomosti, April 21, 2014, www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2014/03/21/roskomnadzoru-pokazyvayut-kotyat-vmesto-sajta-navalnogo.

· #15

“70th Anniversary of Lifting of Siege of Leningrad,” Kremlin.ru, January 27, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6573.

· #16

Natalia Sindeeva, interview with authors, August 2014.

· #17

Natalia Krainova and Anna Dolgov, “Cable Providers Drop Independent Dozhd TV Amid Pressure,” Moscow Times, January 29, 2014, www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/cable-providers-drop-independent-dozhd-tv-amid-pressure/493576.html. See also Will Englund, “Russian TV Channel Takes Flak Just for Asking: ‘Should Leningrad Have Surrendered?’” Washington Post, January 30, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-tv-channel-takes-flak-just-for-asking-should-leningrad-have-surrendered/2014/01/30/c1455812–89c0–11e3–833c-33098f9e5267_story.html.

· #18

Sindeeva, interview, August 2014.

· #19

“Peskov: telekanal Dozhd pereshev vse grani dopustimogo” [Peskov: TV Dozhd Crossed the Line of the Permissible], Interfax, January 29, 2014, www.interfax.ru/russia/354742.

· #20

“Putin—Dozhdu: Ya sdelayu vse, chtobi izbavit vas ot izbitochnogo vnimania kontroliruyushikh organov” [Putin—Dozhd: I’ll Do Anything to Save You from Excessive Attention to Regulatory Bodies], TV Dozhd, April 17, 2014, http://tvrain.ru/articles/putin_dozhdju_ja_sdelaju_vse_chtoby_izbavit_vas_ot_izbytochnogo_vnimanija_kontrolirujuschih_organov-367069.

· #21

“Putin—Dozhdu: I ne daval kommandu kabelshikam prekrashat rabotu s vami” [Putin—Rain, I Did Not Command Cable Manufacturers to Stop Working with You], TV Dozhd, June 6, 2014, http://tvrain.ru/articles/putin_dozhdju_ja_ne_daval_komandu_kabelschikam_prekraschat_rabotu_s_vami-369587.

· #22

The TV Dozhd staff found the new premises only in 2015, at the former factory of Flakon.

· #23

Glenn Kates, “Moscow Freaks Out About Federalization Rally… In Siberia,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 6, 2014, www.rferl.org/content/russia-separatism-rally-siberia/26515418.html.

· #24

BBC World Service statement regarding interview with Artem Loskutov, BBC Media center, August 5, 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/statements/artem-loskutov.

· #25

“Roskomnadzor dobralsya I do ukrainskikh SMI” [Roskomnadzor Reached Ukrainian Media], BBC Ukrainian service, August 4, 2014, www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/ukraine_in_russian/2014/08/140804_ru_s_roskomnadzor_restricting_access.

· #26

Miriam Elder, “Russia Threatens to Ban BuzzFeed,” BuzzFeed.com, December 6, 2014, www.buzzfeed.com/miriamelder/russia-threatens-to-ban-buzzfeed#.wy34B5ad.

· #27

VKontakte was also under pressure. Pavel Durov’s brother Nikolai, who also used to work in VKontakte, posted a message on his page on Sunday, December 22, that on this day alone VKontakte got fifty-three requests from Roskomnadzor to block events, groups, and pages where the word Navalny is mentioned. For details, see http://geektimes.ru/post/243309.

· #28

Ilya Kuvakin and Daria Luganskaya, “V Facebook zablokirovali stranitsu gruppi v podderzhku” [Facebook Blocked a Group Page in Support of Navalny], RBC, December 20, 2014, www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5495b98a9a7947bb5e5f3e5a.

· #29

Andrew Roth and David M. Herszenhorn, “Facebook Page Goes Dark, Angering Russia Dissidents,” New York Times, December 22, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/world/europe/facebook-angers-russian-opposition-by-blocking-protest-page.html?_r=0.

· #30

“Istochniki Dozhdya: Facebook and Twitter otkazalis blokirovat stranitsi storonnikov Navalnogo” [Sources of Dozhd: Facebook and Twitter Refused to Block Pages for Supporters of Navalny], TV Dozhd, December 22, 2014, http://tvrain.ru/articles/istochniki_dozhdja_facebook_i_twitter_otkazalis_blokirovat_stranitsy_storonnikov_navalnogo-379720.

· #31

Maria Tsvetkova, “Kremlin Critic Navalny Given Suspended Sentence, Brother Jailed,” Reuters, December 30, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/30/us-russia-crisis-navalny-idUSKBN0K80AA20141230.

· #1

Sasha Romantsova, interview with authors, September 2014.

· #2

Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukraine’s Opposition Says Government Stirs Violence,” New York Times, January 21, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/world/europe/ukraine-protests.html?_r=0, and Heather Murphy, “Ominous Text Message Sent to Protesters in Kiev Sends Chills Around the Internet,” New York Times, January 22, 2014, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com//2014/01/22/ominous-text-message-sent-to-protesters-in-kiev-sends-chills-around-the-internet.

· #3

Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Defers Aid to Ukraine, and Unrest Persists,” New York Times, January 29, 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/world/europe/ukraine-protests.html.

· #4

In April 2007 Estonia provoked the Kremlin with its decision to move a Soviet war memorial out of the center of the capital. After a massive nationalistic campaign against Estonia in the Russian press, a series of DDOS attacks was launched on the websites of the Estonian government, parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers, and broadcasters. In June 2008 Lithuania came into Russia’s crosshairs when lawmakers voted to ban the public display of Nazi German and Soviet symbols. Some three hundred websites, including those of public institutions such as the National Ethics Body and the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as a string of private companies, had found themselves under cyber siege. Their websites’ content was replaced with images of the red flag of the Soviet Union alongside anti-Lithuanian slogans. In August 2008 the military conflict with Georgia in South Ossetia also included cyber attacks against Georgia’s Internet infrastructure, compromising several Georgian government websites and prompting the government to begin hosting its sites in the United States. Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to disseminate real-time information, was forced to move to a BlogSpot account.

· #5

“Na UNIAN vedetsya mashtabnaya DDoS-ataka” [UNIAN Is Under Massive DDOS Attack], UNIAN, March 3, 2014, www.unian.net/politics/892159-na-unian-vedetsya-masshtabnaya-nepreryivnaya-ddos-ataka.html.

· #6

Pavel Sedakov and Dmitry Filonov, “Pervy Ukrainsky kiberfront: kto i zachem obiavil IT-mobilizatiu?” [The First Ukrainian Cyberfront: Who and Why Announced IT Mobilization?], Forbes Russia, March 4, 2014, www.forbes.ru/tekhnologii/internet-i-svyaz/251623-pervyi-ukrainskii-kiberfront-kto-i-zachem-obyavil-it-mobilizatsi.

· #7

The tactics were not completely abandoned, though, and in two weeks, on March 15, DDOS attacks disrupted access to some NATO sites. They focused on the main NATO public site, www.nato.int, knocking it offline for long periods, and a pro-Russian Ukrainian hacktivist group, Cyber Berkut (clearly echoing the name of the riot police Berkut), claimed responsibility for the attacks. But they were not very serious, and John Bumgarner, a spokesman for the US Cyber Consequences Unit, which assesses the impact of cyber attacks, compared it with “kicking sand into one’s face.” Naked Security, “DDoS Attack Takes Out NATO Websites, Ukraine Connection Claimed,” Sophos, March 17, 2014, https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2014/03/17/ddos-attack-takes-out-nato-websites-ukraine-connection-claimed. Also see Mark Piggot, “Ukraine Crisis: Pro-Russian Hackers Attack Nato Websites,” International Business Times, March 16, 2014, www.ibtimes.co.uk/ukraine-crisis-pro-russian-hackers-attack-nato-websites-1440497.

· #8

Chris Elliot, “The Readers’ Editor On… Pro-Russia Trolling Below the Line on Ukraine Stories,” Guardian, May 4, 2014, www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/04/pro-russia-trolls-ukraine-guardian-online.

· #9

Ilya Klishin, “Maksimalny retvit: Laiki na Zapad” [Maximus Retweet: Likes on the West], Vedomosti, May 21, 2014, www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2014/05/21/lajki-na-zapad.

· #10

Konstantin Kostin’s interview to TV Dozhd, July 1, 2013, http://tvrain.ru/articles/eks_glava_upravlenija_vnutrennej_politiki_kremlja_konstantin_kostin_navalnomu_opasno_idti_na_vybory_karera_nemtsova_zakonchilas_na_vyborah_mera_sochi-346962/?video.

· #11

Ibid.

· #12

Anton Butsenko, “Trolli iz Olgino pereekhali v noviy chetyrekhatazhny office na Savushkina” [Trolls from Olgino Moved to a New Four-Story Office on Savushkina], DP.ru, October 28, 2014, www.dp.ru/a/2014/10/27/Borotsja_s_omerzeniem_mo.

· #13

Dmitry Volchek and Daisy Sindelar, “One Professional Russian Troll Tells All,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, March 27, 2015, www.rferl.org/content/how-to-guid-russian-trolling-trolls/26919999.html.

· #14

The other was of a conversation between Helga Schmidt, deputy secretary general for the External Action Service at the European Union, and Jan Tombinski, an EU representative in Ukraine.

· #15

The account is based on Christopher Miller, conversation with authors, March 2015.

· #16

Christopher J. Miller, “‘Fuck the EU,’ Frustrated Nuland Says to Pyatt, in Alleged Leaked Phone Call,” Kyiv Post, February 6, 2014, www.kyivpost.com/content/politics/fuck-the-eu-frustrated-nuland-says-to-pyatt-in-alleged-leaked-phone-call-336373.html.

· #17

“Ukraine Says Not Investigating Bugging of U.S. Diplomats Phone Talk,” Reuters, February 8, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/08/us-ukraine-call-idUSBREA170G020140208.

· #18

For details, see Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “In Ex-Soviet States, Russian Spy Tech Still Watches You,” Wired.com, December 21, 2012, www.wired.com/2012/12/russias-hand.

· #19

“Turchinov pomenyal vse rukovodstvo SBU” [Turchinov Changed the Entire Leadership of the SBU], Vesti Reporter, March 7, 2014, http://vesti-ukr.com/strana/41511-turchinov-pomenjal-vse-rukovodstvo-sbu.

· #20

“Kadrovie peremeni: Poroshenko naznachil nachalnikom Departamenta operativno-technicheskikh meroptiyatiy SBU Frolova” [Personnel Changes: Poroshenko Appointed as Head of Operational and Technical Measures SBU Frolov], Ukranews, http://ukranews.com/news/129796.ru.

· #21

Over two years we ran a joint investigation along with our friends at Citizen Lab (Canada) and Privacy International (UK) called “Russia’s Surveillance State.” We found that many countries that won their independence in 1991 still live in the shadow of Soviet surveillance practices. In August 2012 the Kyrgyz’s State Committee of National Security put on its website the draft of a national regulation on SORM, which was almost identical to the Russian interception system. The Kyrgyz parliament’s Defense and Security Committee stated in an economic analysis of the proposed SORM legislation that the Russian-made connection device linking SORM equipment and the PU would be three times cheaper than that of the Israeli firm Verint. Moscow hardly missed these opportunities to extend its intelligence positions on the soil of the former Soviet Union, but that option was considered as a minor evil by these countries’ governments. In November 2012 the Radio Liberty’s Kyrgyz Service reported that Russian-made interception equipment could have been used to intercept phone conversations of Kyrgyz politicians leaked online two years ago. The Kyrgyz “telephone gate” scandal greatly embarrassed the provisional government, as it exposed how the positions and money were distributed. Making matters worse, the Russian producers’ tapping gear—Moscow’s Oniks-Line and Novosibirsk’s Sygnatek—were accused of retaining back doors in the equipment. “We shipped the interception equipment to Kyrgyzstan—it was an intergovernmental decision,” Sergei Pykhtunov, deputy director of the Sygnatek, admitted to us. But he said he was not aware of the scandal and dismissed the accusation. Sergei Bogotskoi, CEO of Oniks-Line, took the same line. The scandal did not cause the Kyrgyz government to change its approach to the national interception rules.

· #1

On October 26, 2011, in a filing with the US Trade Representative’s (USTR) office, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) outlined how VKontakte and its unlicensed music service is increasingly undermining the growth of the international legitimate music marketplace. According to the RIAA’s filing, the service’s music functionality is “specifically designed to enable members to upload music and video files, hundreds of thousands of which contain unlicensed copyright works.” “RIAA Highlights Russian Service VKontakte, Others in Report to U.S. Government About Markets Rife with Music Theft,” RIAA, www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?contentselector=newsandviews&news_month_filter=10&news_year_filter=2011&id=B966B360–22F9-C11E-B7A3–50777A8122E7. For details, see Delphine d’Amora, “Record Firms Sue Social Network VK for Piracy,” Moscow Times, April 4, 2014, www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/record-firms-sue-social-network-vk-for-piracy/497473.html; Kathryn Dowling, “VKontakte Case Puts Russian Music Piracy into Spotlight,” BBC, August 11, 2014, www.bbc.com/news/business-28739602; and Martech Social, “Russian Social Network VKontakte Sparks Piracy Worries,” January 22, 2015, www.martechsocial.com/russian-social-network-vkontakte-sparks-piracy-worries.

· #2

Alexandra Bayazitova, “Pavel Durov May Face a Criminal Case for His Expenses,” Izvestia, March 5, 2014, www.izvestia.ru/news/566840.

· #3

“Media Forum of Independent Local and Regional Media,” Transcripts, Kremlin.ru, April 24, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/7075.

· #4

Ibid.

· #5

Leonid Bershidsky, “How Putin Crashed a Russian Internet Stock,” Bloomberg, April 25, 2014, www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014–04–25/how-putin-crashed-a-russian-internet-stock.

· #6

Vsevolod Pulya, “Yandex Reacts to Putin Comments About Foreign Influence as Share Price Falls,” the press release of Yandex (in Russian), Russia Beyond the Headlines, April 28, 2014, http://rbth.com/business/2014/04/28/yandex_reacts_to_putin_comments_about_foreign_influence_as_share_pri_36283.html.

· #7

Maxim Stulov, “Yandex Seeks Putin’s Ear With German Gref Board Appointment,” Moscow Times, May 27, 2014, www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/yandex-seeks-putins-ear-with-german-gref-board-appointment/500969.html.

· #8

“Russian Lawmaker Motions to Probe Internet Giant Yandex,” RAPSI, May 15, 2014, http://rapsinews.com/news/20140515/271323235.html.

· #9

Jason Bush and Alissa de Carbonnel, “Russia Launches Fraud Case Against Backers of Putin Critic Navalny,” Reuters, May 23, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/23/us-russia-navalny-idUSBREA4M05H20140523.

· #10

Kaspersky refused to give an interview with the authors.

· #11

“UPDATE 2—Kaspersky to Buy out US Investors, Rules Out IPO,” Reuters, February 3, 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/kaspersky-idUSL2E8D3ETO20120203.

· #12

About Kaspersky Lab: “Today Kaspersky Lab is the world’s largest privately held vendor of endpoint protection solutions, with a holding registered in the United Kingdom,” www.kaspersky.com/about.

· #13

Kaspersky Lab corporate news, “Laboratoria Kasperskogo prisoedinyaetsa k rabote Ligi Bezopasnogo Interneta” [Kaspersky Lab Joins the Safe Internet League], Kaspersky, February 8, 2011, www.kaspersky.ru/news?id=207733419.

· #14

“The Cyberguard,” Safe Internet League, www.ligainternet.ru/en/liga/activity-cyber.php.

· #15

The primary backer of the League is businessman Konstantin Malofeev, a prominent Orthodox business and political leader who has enjoyed increasing influence since 2012 as conservative and Orthodox beliefs have grown in popularity. In 2014 Malofeev was put under sanctions by the EU and Canada, as Ukraine’s government accused him of financing the rebels in eastern Ukraine on behalf of the Russian government. Both Alexander Borodai, the former prime minister of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, and Igor Strelkov, formerly one of the main commanders of the rebel forces, are ex-Malofeev employees. For details, see Courtney Weaver, “Konstantin Malofeev, Marshall Capital Partners,” Financial Times, September 8, 2013, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/569e533e-051c-11e3–9e71–00144feab7de.html#axzz3UGtNNZEy, and Joshua Keating, “God’s Oligarch,” Slate, October 20, 2014, www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2014/10/konstantin_malofeev_one_of_vladimir_putin_s_favorite_businessmen_wants_to.single.html.

· #16

Statistics 2013, the Russian Association for Electronic Communications, June 10, 2014, http://raec.ru/times/detail/3472.

· #17

At the time, Boris Dobrodeyev was rumored to become the new CEO of VKontakte; he got the position in September 2014. “Son of State Media Chief Appointed CEO of Russia’s VKontakte,” Moscow Times, September 19, 2014, www.themoscowtimes.com/article/son-of-state-media-chief-appointed-ceo-of-russias-vkontakte/507411.html.

· #18

“Internet Entrepreneurship in Russia Forum,” transcripts, Kremlin.ru, June 10, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/22470.

· #19

“Yandex Is Included in the Register of the Organizers of Dissemination of Information,” Rublacklist, September 12, 2014, http://rublacklist.net/8598.

· #20

See www.blog.yandex.ru/post/77678.

· #21

Andrei Kolesnikov, interview with authors, September 2014.

· #22

International Telecommunication Union, Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), World Telecommunication Policy Forum, May 14–16, 2013, www.itu.int/en/wtpf-13/Documents/backgrounder-wtpf-13-ixps-en.pdf.

· #23

Ivan Pavlov (Davydova’s lawyer), interview with authors, March 2015.

· #1

It was a surprising choice. Russky Reporter was a publication very close to the Kremlin, essentially a government-backed media. The idea of cooperating with WikiLeaks on the State Department cables was brought to Vitaly Leibin, editor-in-chief of Russky Reporter, by Israel Shamir, a controversial journalist who styled himself as a WikiLeaks-accredited journalist in Russia. The Guardian reported that Shamir was not only given access to cables but also invoiced WikiLeaks for ?2000, in thanks to “services rendered—journalism.” (See David Leigh and Luke Harding, WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy [New York: Public Affairs, 2011]). Shamir’s son, Johannes Wahlstrom, was a close associate to Assange. In 2016 Shamir wrote extensively for pro-government Russian publications, namely Komsomolskaya Pravda, attacking Hillary Clinton. On July 28 he accused the American establishment of a conspiracy to elect Clinton, referencing the WikiLeaks revelations. He also promised new expos?s from the DNC hacks to follow. See Israel Shamir, “Novie Razoblachenia WikiLeaks: Americanskaya elita ustroila zagovor, chtobi protashit v presidenti Klinton” [New revelations of WikiLeaks: the American elite conspires to elect Clinton to the presidency], Komsomolskaya Pravda, July 28, 2016, www.kp.ru/daily/26561/3577385.

· #2

Mediastan, documentary film, 2013, produced by Julian Assange, Rebecca O’Brien, and Lauren Dark. In the documentary a group of journalists led by Johannes Wahlstrom test the impact of leaked documents as they travel through Central Asia in search of local media outlets willing to publish Cablegate files. Their journey follows the ancient Silk Road traversing Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and US-occupied Afghanistan.

· #3

Mika Velikovsky, interview with authors, January 2017.

· #4

Luke Harding, “Sergei Roldugin, the Cellist who Holds the Key to Tracing Putin’s Hidden Fortune,” Guardian, April 3, 2016, www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/sergei-roldugin-the-cellist-who-holds-the-key-to-tracing-putins-hidden-fortune.

· #5

Luke Harding, “Kremlin Dismisses Revelations in Panama Papers as ‘Putinphobia,’” Guardian, April 4, 2016, www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/04/kremlin-reaction-putin-dmitry-peskov-panama-papers-putinphobia.

· #6

The website of the Russian Ministry of Justice, the list of unwanted organizations, http://minjust.ru/ru/activity/nko/unwanted.

· #7

Mika Velikovsky, interview with the authors.

· #8

“Truth and Justice Regional and Local Forum, President of Russia, April 7, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51685.

· #9

The video of the talk is available on the website of the International Journalism Festival, www.festivaldelgiornalismo.com/programme/2016/from-wikileaks-to-snowden-protecting-high-value-sources-in-the-age-of-mass-surveillance.

· #10

Drew Sullivan, “Journalism or Propaganda: Let’s Help Russian Media the Right Way,” GIJN, August 19, 2015, http://gijn.org/2015/08/19/journalismor-propaganda-lets-help-russian-media-the-right-way.

· #11

The other two participants were Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko and Minister of the Interior Vladimir Kolokoltsev. See “Meeting with Permanent Members of the Security Council,” President of Russia, April 8, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51688.

· #12

“Direct Line with Vladimir Putin,” President of Russia, April 14, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51716.

· #13

Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, “How Hackers Broke into John Podesta and Colin Powell’s Gmail Accounts,” Motherboard, October 20, 2016, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/how-hackers-broke-into-john-podesta-and-colin-powells-gmail-accounts.

· #14

Dan Merica, “WikiLeaks Releases Transcripts of Clinton Goldman Sachs Speeches,” CNN, October 17, 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/15/politics/wikileaks-hillary-clinton-goldman-sachs-speeches; and David Dayen, “Behind Closed Doors, Hillary Clinton Sympathized with Goldman Sachs over Financial Reform,” Intercept, October 11, 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/10/11/behind-closed-doors-hillary-clinton-sympathized-with-goldman-sachs-over-financial-reform.

· #15

Ellen Nakashima, “Russian Government Hackers Penetrated DNC, Stole Opposition Research on Trump,” Washington Post, June 14, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-government-hackers-penetrated-dnc-stole-opposition-research-on-trump/2016/06/14/cf006cb4–316e-11e6–8ff7–7b6c1998b7a0_story.html.

· #16

Vladimir Soldatkin, “Moscow Denies Russian Involvement in U.S. DNC hacking,” Reuters, June 14, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-hack-russia-idUSKCN0Z02EK.

· #17

Dmitri Alperovitch, “Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee,” CrowdStrike Blog, June 15, 2016, www.crowdstrike.com/blog/bears-midst-intrusion-democratic-national-committee.

· #18

In 2010 Alperovitch led the investigation into Operation Aurora, the Chinese penetration into Google and a dozen other companies, and in 2012 he investigated the Night Dragon Chinese espionage operation of the Western multinational oil and gas companies. See Dmitri Alperovitz, MIT Technology Review, www.technologyreview.com/lists/innovators-under-35/2013/entrepreneur/dmitri-alperovitch.

· #19

An excellent example of this kind of government-private cooperation could be found in Daniil Turovsky, “Gruzit po polnoy programme: Zachem goskorporatsii ponadobilas Sistema dlya organizatsii DDoS-atak” [To download: for what the state corporation needs a system of DDoS-attacks], Meduza, September 3, 2015, https://meduza.io/feature/2015/09/03/gruzit-po-polnoy-programme.

· #20

20Alexey Navalny, “Russian ‘Hacker Hell’ Sentenced to 400 Hours Community Service in Germany,” Meduza, August 6, 2015, https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/08/06/russian-hacker-hell-sentenced-to-400-hours-community-service-in-germany. See also Aleksander Gorbachev, “Meet the Hacker who Terrorized the Russian Blogosphere,” Newsweek, July 9, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/2015/07/17/gospel-according-hell-351544.html.

· #21

“Kiberberkut vskryl perepisky evromaidanovtsev s amerikanskimi sponsorami” [CyberBerkut broke into the correspondence of Euromaidan activists with the American sponsors], NTV, March 25, 2014, www.ntv.ru/novosti/869656. See also “09.04.2014 Strike Back!,” We Will Not Forget, https://cyber-berkut.org/en/olden/index5.php.

· #22

Michelle Martin and Erik Kirschbaum, “Pro-Russian Group Claims Cyber Attack on German Government Qebsites,” Reuters, January 7, 2015, www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-cyberattack-idUSKBN0KG15320150107.

· #23

Gordon Corera, “How France’s TV5 Was Almost Destroyed by ‘Russian Hackers,’” BBC, October 10, 2016, www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37590375.

· #24

“Guccifer 2.0 DNC’s Servers Hacked by a Lone Hacker,” Guccifer 2.0, June 15, 2016, https://guccifer2.wordpress.com/2016/06/15/dnc. See also Ellen Nakashima, “‘Guccifer 2.0’ Claims Credit for DNC Hack,” Washington Post, June 15, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/guccifer-20-claims-credit-for-dnc-hack/2016/06/15/abdcdf48–3366–11e6–8ff7–7b6c1998b7a0_story.html?utm_term=.c9440a5d9839.

· #25

Already in 2015 more and more people with expertise in digital forensics and threat intelligence got behind the theory that the technical analysis is sufficient for a proper attribution. The major shift happened around the investigation of the Sony hacking in November 2014, when the attack was attributed to North Korea.

· #26

The US intelligence community reports named the military intelligence, the GRU, and FSB as entities responsible for the attack, and the Obama administration finally sanctioned the GRU and the FSB. See The White House, “FACT SHEET: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment,” December 29, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/29/fact-sheet-actions-response-russian-malicious-cyber-activity-and.

· #27

Lee Fang and Zaid Jilani, “Hacked Emails Reveal NATO General Plotting Against Obama on Russia Policy,” Intercept, July 1, 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/07/01/nato-general-emails.

· #28

Andrea Peterson, “WikiLeaks Posts Nearly 20,000 Hacked DNC Emails Online,” Washington Post, July 22, 2016, www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/07/22/wikileaks-posts-nearly-20000-hacked-dnc-emails-online/?utm_term=.ab5eada621e9. See also Joseph Cox, “Guccifer 2.0 Claims Responsibility for WikiLeaks DNC Email Dump,” Motherboard, July 22, 2016, https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/guccifer-2-claims-responsibility-for-dnc-email-dump.

· #29

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: U.S.-Russia Cooperation on Information and Communications Technology Security,” June 17, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/fact-sheet-us-russian-cooperation-information-and-communications-technol.

· #30

Michael Daniel, interview with authors, March 2017.

· #31

“Interview to Bloomberg,” President of Russia, September 5, 2016, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52830.

· #32

Alex Johnson, “Wikileaks’ Julian Assange: ‘No Proof’ Hacked DNC Emails Came from Russia,” NBC, July 25, 2016, www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/wikileaks-julian-assange-no-proof-hacked-dnc-emails-came-russia-n616541.

· #33

Russell Berman, “Obama: I Told Putin to ‘Cut It Out,’” Atlantic, December 16, 2016, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/obama-russia-hack/510974.

· #34

Evan Osnos, David Remnick, and Joshua Jaffa, “Trump, Putin and the New Cold War,” March 6, 2017, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/06/trump-putin-and-the-new-cold-war.

· #35

Eugene Gerden, “$500 Million for New Russian Cyber Army,” SC Magazine, November 6, 2014, www.scmagazineuk.com/500-million-for-new-russian-cyber-army/article/541257. See also Aleksander Stepanov, “Minoboroni obyavlayet nabor v nauchnuyu rotu, gde gotovyatsa spetsialisti radioelectronnoy borbi” [Defense Ministry Announces Recruitment for Science Troops: Students Will Be Put to Cyber Arms], Moskovsky Komsomolets Online, April 6, 2015, www.mk.ru/politics/2015/04/05/studentov-postavyat-pod-kiberruzhe.html.

· #36

Ken Bensinger, Mark Schoofs, and Miriam Elder, “These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties to Russia,” Buzzfeed, January 10, 2017, www.buzzfeed.com/kenbensinger/these-reports-allege-trump-has-deep-ties-to-russia?utm_term=.mnwx71QK0#.oqNmP5w7Y.

· #37

Homeland Security, “Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security,” October 7, 2016, www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-department-homeland-security-and-office-director-national.

· #38

Lindsey Ellefson, “Roger Stone Tweets Mysteriously About Wikileaks Doing Something to Hillary Clinton Wednesday,” Mediaite, October 2, 2017, www.mediaite.com/online/roger-stone-tweets-mysteriously-about-wikileaks-doing-something-to-hillary-clinton-wednesday.

· #39

Edward Moyer, “WikiLeaks Posts ‘Podesta Emails’ Clinton Wall Street Speeches,” CNET, October 8, 2016, www.cnet.com/uk/news/hillary-clinton-goldman-sachs-speeches-leaked-paid-wikileaks-john-podesta-julian-assange.

· #40

Mark Hensch, “Trump: I Love WikiLeaks,” Hill, October 10, 2017, http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/300327-trump-i-love-wikileaks.

· #41

Kurt Eichenwald, “Dear Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, I Am Not Sidney Blumenthal,” Newsweek, October 10, 2017, www.newsweek.com/vladimir-putin-sidney-blumenthal-hillary-clinton-donald-trump-benghazi-sputnik-508635.

· #42

Grant Stern, “BREAKING: WikiLeaks Switched to Russian Web Hosting During Election,” OccupyDemocrats, March 14, 2017, http://occupydemocrats.com/2017/03/14/breaking-wikileaks-switched-russian-web-hosting-election. Researchers of CitizenLab independently checked the information. According to their information, WikiLeaks used two IP addresses hosted in Russia, one from 2011 and the second one starting in August 2016.

· #43

“Meeting of the Security Council,” President of Russia, November 8, 2016, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53217.

· #44

The account below is based on the authors’ conversations with sources in the Russian secret services and Russian private cybersecurity companies.

· #45

See Chapter 7, for details.

· #46

Kevin Townsend, “50 Hackers Using Lurk Banking Trojan Arrested in Russia,” SecurityWeek, June 2, 2016. See also “Legitimate Remote Access Software Used to Propagate Lurk Gang Trojan,” Kaspersky, July 22, 2016, http://newsroom.kaspersky.eu/en/texts/detail/article/legitimate-remote-access-software-used-to-propagate-lurk-gang-trojan/?no_cache=1&cHash=d808f9064aef2d900856a29ef49c734d.

· #47

Four people were arrested on December 4, 2016: Ruslan Stoyanov, Sergei Mikhailov, his subordinate Dmitry Dokuchaev, and Georgy Fomchenkov, who was reportedly involved in some controversial business activities online. In March 2017 the US Justice Department alleged that Dokuchaev had conspired with, among others, known and unknown FSB officers to protect, direct, facilitate, and pay criminal hackers to gain unauthorized access to the computer networks and user accounts hosted at major companies providing worldwide webmail and Internet-related services (i.e., Yahoo) from at least January 2014. Dokuchaev is wanted by the FBI. See for details, see Jack Stubbs and Svetlana Reiter, “Treason Charges Against Russian Cyber Experts Linked to Seven-Year-Accusations,” Reuters, February 26, 2017, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-cyber-insight-idUKKBN1650M8; and Ellen Nakashima, “Justice Department Charging Russian Spies and Criminal Hackers in Yahoo Intrusion,” Washington Post, March 15, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-charging-russian-spies-and-criminal-hackers-for-yahoo-intrusion/2017/03/15/64b98e32–0911–11e7–93dc-00f9bdd74ed1_story.html.

· #1

“Lifenews Publishes New Secret Phone Conversations of Nemtsov,” Lifenews.ru, December 20, 2011, www.lifenews.ru/news/77529.

· #2

Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 17.